>The Independent (UK)
>
>Missing: crucial facts from the official charge sheet against Bin Laden
>What the Government's dossier against bin Laden doesn't say and
>can't say: One thing is missing from the document 'proving' Bin
>Laden's guilt “ the proof
>By Chris Blackhurst
>07 October 2001
>It was too good to be true. We were told we would be getting evidence of
>Osama bin Laden's guilt. Instead, close analysis of the 21-page document
>put out by the Government on Thursday reveals a report of conjecture,
>supposition and unsubstantiated assertions of fact. It uses every trick in 
>the
>Whitehall drafter's arsenal to make the reader believe they are reading
>something they are not: a damning indictment of Mr bin Laden for the
>events of 11 September.
>No wonder Tony Blair and his officials are delighted with the reaction to
>publication of the dossier. One Whitehall source told the Independent on
>Sunday they were "chuffed with two newspapers for hailing it as 'proof' of 
>bin
>Laden's involvement and delighted it got such a good reaction overall".
>Ministers believe the document has sealed the propaganda war, convincing
>the country of the need to move against Mr bin Laden and al-Qa'ida and to
>accept limited British and civilian casualties. To their relief they are not
>being subjected to rigorous questioning on the report, either from their own
>supporters, the Opposition, or much of the media. Officials are also
>pleased: the document successfully papers over the cracks in their own
>intelligence operations.
>The report was put together by a committee which included senior
>members of MI5 and MI6, working round the clock, with drafts going
>backwards and forwards to Washington. Within Whitehall, the dossier was
>seen as vital to gaining the approval of a naturally cautious and sceptical
>British public. As a paper produced by mandarins anxious to brook no
>argument it is a classic of its kind, straight from the script of Yes 
>Minister:
>short on checkable detail; long on bold assertion; highly selective with the
>choice of facts.
>Officials when they prepare such reports operate to a set of principles. They
>know that unlike the US, and thanks to their efforts in suppressing freedom
>of information down the years, Britain is a secret society. We are not 
>used to
>having anything presented to us about intelligence matters and threats to
>national security. That, plus the British characteristic of not defying
>authority, especially in times of crisis, means that if the Government says
>loudly enough that something is "evidence", even if it is not, we will 
>accept it
>as such.
>That is why the very first sentence in the paper, in the introduction, 
>states:
>"The clear conclusions reached by the government are: Osama bin Laden
>and Al Qaida, the terrorist network which he heads, planned and carried out
>the atrocities on 11 September 2001." This is the introduction, not the
>conclusion or an executive summary. Introductions, as the authors knew too
>well, normally set up a document, relating the background as to why the
>book or, in this instance, a government document, has been written. Here,
>that convention was rejected: from the word go, the Government wanted to
>ensure the point of the document was conveyed.
>The document carries a health warning that intelligence material has been
>withheld to protect the safety of sources. But, lawyers point out, this is 
>not
>good enough. Assuming one aim of the military build-up is to try to capture
>Mr bin Laden and put him on trial, that so-far-unseen evidence would have
>to be displayed “ because on the basis of what has been released there is
>no chance of his being prosecuted, let alone convicted. "The Prime Minister
>told Parliament that this evidence was of an even more direct nature
>indicating guilt," said Richard Gordon QC. "The document makes it clear
>that the additional evidence is 'too sensitive to release'. That may be 
>so, but
>in any criminal prosecution against bin Laden the necessary evidence
>would have to be adduced for the case to be proved."
>For page after page, the paper spews out facts about Mr bin Laden. In
>1996, he issued a declaration of jihad, or holy war. In February 1998 he
>issued and signed a fatwa which included a decree to all Muslims that "the
>killing of Americans and their civilian and military allies is a religious 
>duty for
>each and every Muslim to be carried out..." In the same year he also said
>that acquiring chemical or nuclear weapons for the defence of Muslims was
>a "religious duty". It might look like evidence of something, but it is 
>not proof
>he organised the 11 September attacks. "All this shows, in the language of
>the lawyers, propensity, but it proves little," said Mr Gordon.
>More pertinent to 11 September were two TV interviews he gave, in 1997
>and 1998, in which he referred to the terrorists who carried out the earlier
>attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 as "role models". In December
>1999, a terrorist cell linked to al-Qa'ida was discovered trying to carry out
>attacks in the US. Other attacks on US targets by al-Qa'ida or terrorists
>trained at bin Laden camps were made in January and October 2000.
>Again, said Mr Gordon, it is not enough. "This material shows that bin
>Laden may well have been responsible for the 11 September massacre but
>it does not, of itself, prove that he was." The document goes into great 
>detail
>about the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.
>But there is not one single fact presented that was not already known.
>While the operation was similar to 11 September “ well planned, two
>attacks on the same day, suicide attackers indiscriminate killing of 
>civilians,
>including Muslims “ it does not prove anything.
>Officials deny that the minute description of the previous bombings was
>designed to cover up cracks in their own intelligence about 11 September.
>Nevertheless, it is noticeable that in a 21-page document the overwhelming
>bulk of it is devoted to rehashing old information. It is not until page 
>18 and
>paragraph 61 that the reader is told something new about 11 September.
>This is that three of the 19 hijackers have been "positively identified as
>associates of Al Qaida" and that one of them "has been identified as playing
>key roles in both the East African embassy attacks and the USS Cole
>attack". The word "associates" suggests the authorities lack intelligence on
>al-Qa'ida: they think they know who may be involved but they are not sure,
>and they are not certain where they come in the pecking order “ hence the
>catch-all, "associates". The three are understood to be: Khalid Almihdhar
>and Nawaf Alhazmi, both filmed secretly in Kuala Lumpur meeting other al-
>Qa'ida members involved in the USS Cole bombing in Aden; and Mohamed
>Atta. Suspected of being the ringleader, Atta is believed to have been a
>member of Islamic Jihad, a major grouping within al-Qa'ida, and the
>authorities are convinced he received training at a bin Laden camp in
>Afghanistan. The hijacker who played a key role in the embassy, USS Cole
>and 11 September attacks, is thought to refer to Almihdhar. If there is a
>hijacker linking all three, that is a crucial piece of evidence since 
>there is no
>doubt al-Qa'ida committed the earlier bombings.
>The next paragraph, 62, promises much and delivers little. Prefaced with
>another rider about names remaining anonymous to protect sources, it
>begins by saying how, prior to 11 September, Mr bin Laden "mounted a
>concerted propaganda campaign ... justifying attacks on Jewish and
>American targets". It was well known in the Middle East that, earlier this
>year, a bin Laden recruitment video was in circulation, exhorting Muslims to
>lay down their lives for the jihad. The video makes no mention of any
>coming big assault nor does it refer to 11 September or possible targets in
>the US.
>Last week it emerged that Mr bin Laden called his adoptive mother in Syria
>on 10 September to tell her there would be "big news", subsequent to
>which he might be out of touch for some time. It is hard to believe that
>someone as cautious as him would risk such a call. However, this is
>understood to be what is being referred to when the document says, in
>paragraph 62: "We have learned, subsequent to 11 September, that bin
>Laden himself asserted shortly before 11 September that he was preparing
>a major attack on America." The document goes on, saying that in August
>and early September, close bin Laden associates were warned to return to
>Afghanistan by 10 September.
>This is new, and odd. Since the attacks, known al-Qa'ida associates have
>been picked up or they are being watched. If there was advice to go to
>Afghanistan presumably they ignored it or did not receive it. The names of
>the "close associates" are not specified, neither is any more detail made
>available “ which is a mystery. It is hard to see why giving a bit more 
>detail
>would compromise anybody or a foreign intelligence service that may be
>monitoring their calls.
>Again, this tantalising paragraph “by far the most intriguing in the
>document “says that just before the attacks "some known associates of bin
>Laden were naming the date for action as on or around 11 September".
>What associates? How? When? Again, no detail is supplied.
>Then, the paragraph continues, "one of bin Laden's closest and most senior
>associates was responsible for the detailed planning of the attacks". This is
>thought to be a reference to either Mohamed Atef, al-Qa'ida's operations
>chief, or Ayman al Zawahiri, Mr bin Laden's deputy. Another senior al-
>Qa'ida member being mentioned by those close to the investigation is Abu
>Zubeidah.
>After all this, the most vital paragraph in the paper ends with this curious
>sentence: "There is evidence of a very specific nature relating to the 
>guilt of
>bin Laden and his associates that is too sensitive to release."
>What this document is not is a detailed exposition of the investigation to
>date. To be fair, that is still ongoing, but providing that amount of
>information would distract from the paper's main purpose, to blame Mr bin
>Laden. This is summarised in the final narrative paragraph, 69: "No other
>organisation has both the motivation and the capability to carry out attacks
>like those of the 11 September “ only the Al Qaida network under Osama
>bin Laden." This smacks of exasperation. To ram that point home,
>paragraph 70, "conclusion", repeats the message of the introduction. This,
>in the end, is what the paper is for, a Government plea for trust: it was Mr
>bin Laden. To which the response must be: we believe you “ but prove it.
>
>==========================================================
>======================
>Tony Blair™s bin Laden dossier: a pretext instead of proof
>By Chris Marsden and Barry Grey
>6 October 2001
>Back to screen version | Send this link by email | Email the author
>
>The document presented to Britain™s parliament on October 4 by Prime
>Minister Tony Blair has been hailed by the media as proof that Osama bin
>Laden and his Al Qaeda network planned and carried out the September
>11
>hijack-bombings in New York and Washington. In fact, Blair™s dossier is a
>clumsy patchwork of assertions that provides no actual evidence
>establishing
>the guilt of bin Laden or the complicity of his Taliban protectors.
>
>A review of the document makes clear that it is an attempt to silence the
>demand for proof of bin Laden™s guilt, without actually providing it, and
>thereby ease the path for the US and Britain to launch a war against
>Afghanistan.
>
>Last week the Bush administration reneged on a promise to make public
>the
>evidence it claimed to possess proving bin Laden™s guilt. Had everything
>gone to according to plan, there is little doubt that this state of affairs
>would have continued and bombs would have rained down on Afghanistan
>without
>any pretence of having made the case against bin Laden and the Taliban.
>
>However, Bush faced opposition from Pakistan and the Arab regimes,
>which
>feared an explosive reaction should the US begin bombing a Muslim
>country
>without any concrete proof to justify such an action. The document
>presented
>by Blair was part of an international effort to placate America™s wavering
>allies and give them something to present before their own people.
>
>The dossier begins with the following caveat: śThis document does not
>purport to provide a prosecutable case against Osama bin Laden in a court
>of
>law.ťThis acknowledgment is rationalized on the grounds that śIntelligence
>often cannot be used evidentially, due both to the strict rules of
>admissibility and to the need to protect the safety of sources.ť
>
>Three things can be said regarding this statement.
>
>First, the premise that a lower standard of evidence is sufficient to
>justify a war than would be the norm for establishing innocence or guilt in
>a court of law is, at best, dubious. The incalculable consequences of a
>military attack argue for a standard of proof no less strict than that
>required in a legal case. In court what is at stake is the fate of the
>defendants as individuals, whereas the US and Britain are about to launch
>a
>military campaign in which the lives of an unknown number of innocent
>civilians are threatened.
>
>Second, the claim that intelligence considerations prohibit those about to
>wage war from presenting evidence justifying such a course is a blanket
>rationalization for any and all military action. Even if one grants the
>legitimacy of withholding some evidence, it is not credible to assert that
>on security grounds no concrete proof can be made public. Such a stance
>amounts to an assertion of the right to play judge, jury and executioner.
>
>Third, Blair™s document is not a serious presentation of evidence that falls
>somewhat short of the rigorous standards of a legal indictment. It is devoid
>of any independently verifiable facts that establish the guilt of either bin
>Laden, Al Qaeda or the Taliban in connection with the September 11 terror
>attacks.
>
>Most of what the document puts forward was previously reported in the
>media.
>All of its allegations are unsubstantiated. The reader is expected to accept
>its claims on faith.
>
>The document is divided into three main headings. The most crucial is the
>section purporting to deal with Al Qaeda™s role in the September 11 terror
>attacks. This constitutes just nine points out of the seventy contained in
>the 15-page dossier.
>
>In an evident attempt to obscure the flimsy character of this pivotal
>section, the authors have filled the bulk of the document with pages
>purportedly outlining Al Qaeda™s previous involvement in terrorist attacks
>against the US, together with a presentation of the historical origins of
>bin Laden™s Al Qaeda network and the Taliban regime.
>
>In the section dealing with September 11, only one apparently concrete
>connection between Al Qaeda and the hijack-bombings is made: the claim
>that
>of the 19 identified hijackers, śAt least three of them have already been
>positively identified as associates of Al Qaeda. One has been identified as
>playing key roles in both the East African embassy attacks and the USS
>Cole
>attack.ť
>
>But this statement raises more questions than it answers. If the identities
>of the three are known, why are they not named? What possible harm could
>it
>do?
>
>Secondly, the description of the three as śassociates of Al Qaedaťis so
>broad and amorphous as to render it almost meaningless. The document
>acknowledges that Al Qaeda is a loose organization of many different
>groupings. Even if the three were in some way identified with Al Qaeda, this
>by itself would not prove that either Al Qaeda or bin Laden personally
>planned or ordered the September 11 attacks. Finally, the document merely
>asserts the existence of evidence linking the three to Al Qaeda, without
>actually presenting factual proof.
>
>The Bush administration, in particular, treads on thin ice when it speaks
>loosely of ślinksťbetween bin Laden, bin Laden™s associates and various
>other individuals. None other than the Wall Street Journal reported in a
>September 27 article of documented links between leading figures in the
>Republican Party, including George W. Bush™s father, the former president,
>and the bin Laden family.
>
>The Journal wrote: śAmong its far-flung business interests, the well-heeled
>Saudi Arabian clan”which says it is estranged from Osama”is an investor
>in a
>fund established by the Carlyle Group, a well-connected Washington
>merchant
>bank specializing in buyouts of defense and aerospace companies.
>
>śThrough this investment and its ties to Saudi royalty, the bin Laden family
>has become acquainted with some of the biggest names in the Republican
>Party. In recent years, former President Bush, ex-Secretary of State James
>Baker and ex-Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci have made the
>pilgrimage to
>the bin Laden family™s headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.ť
>
>Regarding the events of September 11, the document goes on to make
>further
>assertions: that bin Laden himself declared shortly before September 11
>that
>he was preparing a major attack on America and called close associates to
>return to Afghanistan from other parts of the world by September 10; and
>that śSince 11 September we have learned that one of bin Laden™s closest
>and
>most senior associates was responsible for the detailed planning of the
>attacks.ť
>
>Once again a man considered to be at the very top of bin Laden™s
>organization, who is allegedly directly responsible for the terror outrage,
>is not named. Why?
>
>There follows this significant statement: śThere is evidence of a very
>specific nature relating to the guilt of bin Laden and his associates that
>is too sensitive to release.ť
>
>Whether or not the authors of the document are aware of it, this sentence
>amounts to a tacit admission that they have produced nothing of a śspecific
>natureťproving a connection between bin Laden and the September 11
>attacks.
>
>The evidence regarding previous terror attacks is hardly more substantial.
>Names and incidents are cited in connection with a number of high-profile
>attacks, but these are garnered from the trial testimony of a few individual
>defendants made under extreme duress.
>
>To fill in the obvious gaps, the following assertion is made in an extended
>preamble dealing with the history of Al Qaeda: śOsama bin Laden has
>claimed
>credit for the attack on US soldiers in Somalia in October 1993, which
>killed 18; for the attack on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in
>August 1998 which killed 224 and injured nearly 5000; and were linked [sic]
>to the attack on the USS Cole on 12 October 2000, in which 17 crew
>members
>were killed and 40 others injured.ť
>
>No such admission has ever been made, and none is cited in the
>document.
>Instead the reader is directed toward various anti-American statements and
>comments from bin Laden supportive of anti-US terrorist attacks.
>
>(The inclusion of the attack on American soldiers in Somalia is entirely out
>of place. That incident cannot legitimately be considered a terrorist
>attack, since the Somalis involved were opposing US soldiers, not civilians,
>and their resistance was part of a struggle against a US military occupation
>of their country. The US troops, moreover, were involved in an aggressive
>action to capture Somali officials who had run afoul of American designs.)
>
>The actual material presented in the document argues against the assertion
>that bin Laden claimed responsibility for the named terrorist attacks. When
>bin Laden was questioned by Time magazine regarding the August 1998
>bombings
>of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, he
>refused to either confirm or deny any responsibility. His quoted reply is
>simply a restatement of his fatwa, followed by the declaration, śOur job is
>to instigate and, by the grace of God, we did that, and certain people
>responded to this instigation.ťWhen asked if he knew the attackers, bin
>Laden simply called them śreal men.ťAs deplorable as such statements are,
>they do not constitute an admission of responsibility.
>
>In point 51, the dossier notes the existence of documents in which an
>unrelated group, the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places,
>claims responsibility for the East African embassy bombings. The Blair
>dossier simply dismisses this inconvenient information with the claim that
>the organization is śfictitious.ť
>
>One statement in the document undermines its own invocation of security
>needs as the justification for omitting specific evidence. In point 14, the
>dossier asserts that the US government śwell before September 11 2001ť
>handed over evidence of Al Qaeda™s guilt in orchestrating the East African
>embassy attacks to the Taliban.
>
>If the US government felt it could provide secret intelligence to the
>Taliban, whom it now accuses of sponsoring a global anti-American murder
>incorporated, how can it cite the need for secrecy and the protection of
>sources to justify concealing crucial evidence from its own people and the
>rest of the world today?
>
>Politically, the most significant part of Blair™s dossier is the section
>that purports to outline the historical origins of Al Qaeda and the Taliban
>regime. This potted history, by way of omission, points to critical facts
>that both the US and Britain are intent on obscuring because they reveal
>the
>political responsibility of successive governments in Washington and
>London
>for the rise of bin Laden and the Taliban, and the spread throughout Central
>Asia and the Middle East of the reactionary brand of nationalism and
>religious obscurantism which they embody.
>
>The document takes as its starting point the year 1989, when, it claims, bin
>Laden and others founded Al Qaeda. The authors conveniently omit any
>reference to the previous decade, during which the American CIA, with the
>assistance of the British Special Air Service (SAS), funded, trained and
>armed the Mujahedin as part of the Cold War struggle against the Soviet
>Union, which invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew 10 years later.
>Among
>those with whom the Americans worked to undermine Soviet influence was
>Osama
>bin Laden.
>
>This is the real history, without knowledge of which it is impossible to
>understand the destruction of secular political forces in Afghanistan and
>the sudden rise to prominence of the Taliban, whose ideological and
>political roots lie in the Mujahedin groups that were nurtured by the US.
>(The US-Taliban connection was evidenced by the initial tacit support of
>Washington for the Taliban regime when it took power in 1996.)
>
>If, after three-and-a-half weeks, this crude admixture of unsubstantiated
>assertions and historical falsifications is all that can be presented to the
>public, there can be only two possible explanations:
>
>Either the US government has no proof of a direct connection between
>Osama
>bin Laden, the Taliban and the September 11 attacks, or it cannot release
>the evidence it has because the information would in some way implicate
>individuals or organizations connected to American intelligence or that of
>an allied state.
>
>In exposing the fraudulent character of this document, the World Socialist
>Web Site is in no way motivated by a desire to protect bin Laden or the
>Taliban, or maintain their innocence in regard to last month™s attacks. They
>may very well be complicit in the hijack-bombings. Their politics and
>methods are deeply reactionary and hostile to the interests of the working
>class and oppressed masses in the Middle East, Central Asia and every
>other
>part of the world.
>
>But our rejection of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism does not in the
>slightest lessen our opposition to the US and British governments and their
>militaristic agenda. The fact that they have failed to make public any
>serious evidence establishing the culpability of those singled out for
>retaliation is of enormous significance. It shows that they have seized on
>the September 11 tragedy as an opportunity to pursue an international
>agenda
>long in the making. They are seeking to whip up a war fever so they can
>pursue geo-strategic aims in the oil-rich Middle East and Central Asian
>regions in a manner that would have been politically unthinkable prior to
>September 11.